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Abstract 
The present study examined the viability of incorporating task-contingent units into 
the study of personality at work, using conscientiousness as an illustrative example. We used 
experience sampling data from 132 managers to show that: (i) momentary conscientiousness 
at work is contingent on the difficulty and urgency demands of the tasks people are engaged 
in; (ii) there are significant and stable differences between people in the extent to which their 
conscientiousness behaviors are contingent on task demands; and, (iii) individual differences 
in task-contingent conscientiousness is related to, though distinct from, individual differences 
in trait conscientiousness. We also provide evidence in relation to (iv) need for cognition as a 
possible antecedent of task-contingent conscientiousness, and (v) adaptive performance on a 
cognitive task as a possible consequence of it. We discuss the theoretical implications of our 
findings for the cognitive nature of personality and the way in which conscientiousness is 
expressed at work. Practical implications in relation to the predictive function of personality 
and applications that focus on behavioral change are also discussed.  
 
Keywords: conscientiousness, within-person variability, task-contingent personality units 
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Task-Contingent Conscientiousness as a Unit of Personality at Work 
Advances in the study of personality in organizational settings over the past 20 years 
have been based on the conceptualization of personality in terms of cross-situationally 
consistent and temporally stable traits. However, individuals also show large amounts of 
variability in their momentary responses across situations (e.g., Fleeson, 2001), a finding that 
is not well-accounted for by a purely between-person trait approach to personality. The 
present paper adopts a dynamic approach to the study of one personality variable that is 
highly relevant to work, namely conscientiousness. Although momentary conscientiousness 
itself is not the main focus of the present paper, we argue for the contingency of momentary 
conscientiousness on situational cues and propose that individual differences in these 
contingencies (a variable that we refer to as task-contingent conscientiousness) capture 
meaningful aspects of personality. Conscientiousness is the personality factor with the 
strongest validity for predicting performance across work contexts (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 
1991; Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001; Salgado, 1997) and therefore provides a strong test of 
the potential usefulness of integrating contingent units into the study of personality at work. 
First, we provide a brief outline of previous research on personality at work and its emphasis 
on between-person trait differences. We then describe a more dynamic approach to 
personality that has started to emerge within the field in general. In the sections that follow, 
we outline some questions of interest that arise within this approach in relation to the 
conscientiousness dimension, and report the results of a study designed to address these 
questions.  
Personality at Work 
The study of personality at work has seen a resurgence over the past two decades, a 
development that can be largely attributed to the conceptualization of personality in terms of 
the Five-Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & Costa, 1999). The factors of the FFM are 
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predominantly viewed as decontextualized traits that remain relatively stable over the life 
span and this is reflected both in the research questions that have been addressed and the 
research designs and methodologies that have been employed to study personality at work. In 
the typical study, differences between people in personality characteristics are related to 
between-person differences in important organizational outcomes such as job performance 
(e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991), job satisfaction (e.g., Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002), or 
leadership (e.g., Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002). Some studies have investigated the 
moderating effects of situational characteristics, such as job autonomy, and the mediating 
effects of cognitive and motivational variables, such as goal setting, on personality-work 
outcome relationships (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993; Barrick & Mount, 1993; Barrick, 
Mitchell, & Stewart, 2003), using between-person designs and analyses. Similarly, more 
recent studies that have examined the predictive validity of broad versus narrow personality 
dimensions (e.g., Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki, & Cortina, 2006), nonlinear personality-
performance relationships (e.g., LaHuis, Martin, & Avis, 2005), or the interactive effects of 
multiple personality variables (e.g., Witt, Burke, Barrick, & Mount, 2002) are also based on a 
purely between-person approach. 
The studies of between-person variability that have characterized the above literature 
have contributed to our knowledge of the stable situational and personality-related 
differences between people, and the effects of these variables on work outcomes of interest. 
However, individuals also display variability in their responses across situations (e.g., 
Fleeson, 2001). Previously, this variability has been viewed as generated externally from the 
personality system in studies of stable traits such as the FFM. However, to the degree that 
within-person variability in responses across situations is systematic, this variability may 
serve as the basis of units of personality that capture the dynamic aspects of individuals 
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995, 1998). Consistent with this view, a more dynamic approach has 
Conscientiousness     4 
 
started to emerge within the general personality literature which highlights the importance of 
integrating contingent units into the study of personality (e.g., Fleeson, 2001; Fournier, 
Moskowitz, & Zuroff, 2008).  
Dynamic Approach to Personality 
In contrast to the focus on cross-situationally stable aspects of personality and 
between-person analyses that dominate within the organizational literature, research within 
the general personality literature has begun to focus on within-person variability (e.g., 
Fleeson, 2001; Fournier et al., 2008). This approach makes use of experience sampling 
methodology (Beal & Weiss, 2003) to assess the variability of the individual’s momentary 
responses across different situations and the situational cues that trigger within-person 
changes.  The exemplar of this approach is the Cognitive-Affective Personality System 
(CAPS) model proposed by Mischel and Shoda (1995, 1998) in which within-person 
variability is a function of situation-response contingencies of the form, “if this situation, then 
that response”. The groundwork for the CAPS approach to personality comes from research 
conducted by Walter Mischel and colleagues (e.g., Mischel & Peake, 1982; Shoda, Mischel, 
& Wright, 1994; Wright & Mischel, 1987). Mischel and Shoda  (1995, 1998) summarize 
empirical evidence that demonstrates individuals display large amounts of behavioral 
variability across situations and that this variability is an expression of a stable underlying 
personality system, which they conceptualize in terms of a set of mediating processes whose 
interactions result in predictable situation-behavior relations.  
The contingent “if this, then that” relations that Mischel and Shoda (1995, 1998) 
hypothesized lead to the stable within-person aspects of personality reflect the same type of 
knowledge structures that cognitive psychologists have proposed as underpinning all forms of 
human behavior (Anderson, 1983). This knowledge may be in the form of procedural 
knowledge that typically exerts a direct influence on emotional and behavioral responses 
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without recourse to any conscious processing (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; Anderson, 1983), 
such as has been employed as explanatory mechanisms for expertise (Ericsson & Charness, 
1994), automatic processing (Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994) and national culture (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Peterson & Wood, 2008). . Alternatively, the underlying knowledge 
structure may facilitate consciously controlled processing of information and may be held in 
a declarative form that is available for conscious recall and oral expression. With regard to 
their development, the knowledge structures are acquired through repeated exposure to 
situations, actions and outcomes over a person’s lifetime.  The emotional and behavioral 
responses that come to represent an individual’s personality may be learned through 
modeling, experimentation, instruction and other forms of guidance and reinforcement 
(Bandura, 1986). The development of knowledge structures may also be the product of 
biological and neurochemical influences, which can shape both the propensity for certain 
behaviors and emotions and the evaluations of outcomes as either rewarding or punishing. 
The work by Mischel and others (e.g., Fleeson, 2007; Fournier et al., 2008) has 
established situation-response contingencies as meaningful aspects of personality, yet, to 
date, organizational researchers have been slow to take up such constructs as part of their 
research. Furthermore, although experience sampling methodology is increasingly being used 
to study dynamic phenomena within organizational contexts, this body of research has 
primarily focused on outcomes that are conceptually distinct from personality, such as 
momentary performance (Fisher & Noble, 2004), job satisfaction (Weiss, Nicholas, & Daus, 
1999), organizational citizenship behavior (Ilies, Scott, & Judge, 2006), or well-being 
(Harris, Daniels, & Briner, 2003); where personality has been included in such studies, it has 
typically been conceptualized in terms of dispositional traits (e.g., Ilies & Judge, 2002; Ilies 
et al., 2006). 
Hypotheses Development 
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Although the dynamic approach to personality provides a broad meta-theoretical 
framework for studying dynamic aspects of personality, it does not specify the content of 
personality to be studied (Shoda & Mischel, 2006). In the present research we specifically 
focus on situation-response contingencies related to conscientiousness, with the purpose of 
investigating the extent and nature of such contingencies at work. The choice of 
conscientiousness as the content of interest is motivated by the relevance of this dimension 
within work settings. At the trait level, conscientiousness is the strongest personality 
predictor of job performance (e.g., Barrick et al., 2001; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000; Salgado, 
1997). Many of the facets that characterize conscientiousness tap into behaviors that on face 
value are highly desirable for performance at work (e.g., competence, orderliness, 
achievement-orientation and self-discipline; see Costa & McCrae, 1992). In its broadest 
sense, conscientiousness encompasses variables that include a wide range of motivational 
tendencies (see Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005), including behavioral 
responses traditionally included in definitions of work motivation (e.g., Seo, Barrett, & 
Bartunek, 2004).  
In our study, we distinguish between the expression of conscientious behavior at a 
given moment in time (which we refer to as momentary conscientiousness, see Fleeson, 
2001) and conscientiousness as a trait that characterizes a general predisposition to behave 
conscientiously across different occasions. The latter describes a general characteristic of the 
person. Individual differences in trait conscientiousness, like other trait constructs, have been 
conceptualized in terms of internal factors such as differences in neurobiological variables 
(e.g., Depue, 1995).  In contrast, momentary conscientiousness is not a stable property of the 
person but rather an unstable quality that at least partly reflects forces outside the person. 
Probabilistically, individuals who score high on trait conscientiousness are more likely than 
low scorers to express conscientious behavior at a given point in time (i.e., to score higher on 
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momentary conscientiousness); however, momentary conscientiousness may also vary within 
a person from occasion to occasion, for example in response to the demands of the situation. 
As such, conscientiousness expressed at a given moment in time is a behavioral response that 
can reflect the effects of underlying personality traits and/or situational factors, but the 
construct itself lies outside the personality system. 
Although we do not conceptualize momentary conscientiousness as a personality 
variable, in the section that follows we argue that the extent to which an individual tends to 
adjust their level of conscientiousness in response to situational demands is an important 
aspect of personality. We identify these contingent situation-response units—which we refer 
to as task-contingent conscientiousness—with the “if-then” contingencies of the CAPS 
model. We hypothesize that individual differences in task-contingent conscientiousness 
represent stable differences between people, and therefore meet the litmus test of 
repeatability that is required for the inference of personality (see Fleeson & Noftle, 2008). 
Furthermore, we propose that these differences arise at least partly from processes other than 
those implicated in individual differences in trait conscientiousness, and therefore that 
individual differences in the task-contingent conscientiousness represent an aspect of 
personality that is distinct from differences in trait conscientiousness. Finally we explore one 
possible antecedent of task-contingent conscientiousness, namely need for cognition, and one 
possible consequence of it, namely adaptive performance on a cognitive task. 
The Contingency of Momentary Conscientiousness on Task Demand 
A core focus of the dynamic approach to personality is on the way in which 
individuals express their attributes across different occasions. Within this approach 
personality is conceptualized as “a flexible resource that supports adaptation to the moment” 
(Fleeson & Jolley, 2006, p.41). Thus, behavioral responses such as conscientiousness are 
seen in strategic terms: Individuals vary their level of conscientiousness across situations to 
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match the functional value of conscientious behavior for the situation. This viewpoint 
contrasts with the alternative possibility in which conscientious behavior is expressed 
indiscriminately or in erratic ways, as documented in studies of personality disorders (e.g., 
Widiger, 1993). Consequently, our first research question addresses the adaptability of 
conscientious behavior: In general, do individuals systematically vary their level of 
momentary conscientiousness in accordance with situational demands? A contingent 
approach to personality is justified to the extent that individuals do show discriminant 
responding across situations (Fleeson, 2007). 
As a first step to addressing this question, one must identify the specific situational 
features that are likely to be relevant for the expression of momentary conscientiousness. 
Situations can be defined in many ways, including where and when they occur, who is 
present, and what activities are undertaken (Saucier, Bel-Bahar, & Fernandez, 2007). Tett and 
Burnett (2003) distinguish between three sources of situational cues that are likely to be 
relevant in work settings, namely the task at hand, other people and organizational 
characteristics. Whereas the tasks that individuals engage in and the people they interact with 
are likely to vary across the workday, organizational characteristics tap into macro-level 
factors that are unlikely to vary from day to day (e.g., policies, reward structures). In the 
present study we focus on the task as the source of situational variability. Although there is 
little knowledge about the situational features that explain within-person variability in 
momentary conscientiousness (Fleeson, 2007), there is good reason for expecting task 
characteristics to be a relevant source of situational variability for this dimension. The 
conscientiousness factor has been explicitly defined in terms of its task facilitation properties 
(e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999), and inventories designed to operationalize the FFM 
consistently identify conscientiousness as directly relevant to the way in which individuals 
approach and complete tasks (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Pryor & Taylor, 2000). 
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Furthermore, empirically, momentary conscientiousness has previously been shown to 
increase strongly as the situation becomes more task-oriented, whereas it is unrelated or only 
weakly related to other situational characteristics such as the friendliness, status or anonymity 
of the people present (Fleeson, 2007).  
A second issue in characterizing situations involves the distinction between nominal 
and psychological features of the situation. Nominal features are diverse and include the 
where, what and who of the situation (e.g., giving a presentation at work to a group of 
colleagues, writing an email at your desk). Due to their specificity, the effects of nominal 
features are of limited generalizability (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Furthermore, nominal 
features do not capture the meaning of the situation for the individual. Consequently, the 
same nominal feature can have different effects on behavior for a given individual depending 
on how it is interpreted.  In contrast, psychological features describe situations in terms of 
their functional equivalence across different nominal features (e.g., the perceived difficulty of 
a task), and therefore generalize across a broad range of situations. Also, as noted by Fleeson 
(2007), this approach is a dimensional one in that situations are represented in terms of 
degrees of a characteristic, and consequently situation-response contingencies can be 
operationalized as regression slopes that have direction and graded magnitude. 
In the present study we focus on two psychological dimensions of tasks that are likely 
to exert a strong influence on the expression of momentary conscientiousness, namely task 
difficulty and task urgency. We propose that these characteristics encourage conscientious 
behavior by increasing the demands that the task makes on the individual’s psychological 
resources. We assume that over time individuals are exposed to and perform a variety of tasks 
at work. Furthermore, they observe work colleagues experiencing and responding to similar 
tasks. As a result of these direct and observational experiences and their observations of the 
consequences of different responses, individuals learn to differentiate between tasks based on 
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their demand levels and to produce behaviors that represent functional responses to those 
demands. Conscientious behaviors such as effort, efficiency, self-discipline and orderliness 
will typically be a functional way of responding to difficult or urgent tasks as they allow the 
individual to cope with the increasing workload and immediacy requirements signalled by 
task difficulty and urgency (Capa, Audiffren & Ragot, 2008; also see Bluedorn & Denhardt, 
1988). Moreover, given that the volitional and self-regulatory behaviors that are encompassed 
by conscientiousness are based on a limited resource (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, 
& Tice, 1998), it will generally be adaptive to conserve this resource by decreasing 
conscientious behavior when tasks become less difficult or urgent. Consequently, if 
personality does represent an adaptive entity, as is assumed by the dynamic approach (e.g., 
Fleeson & Jolley, 2006), then individuals should typically express greater levels of 
momentary conscientiousness when completing difficult or urgent tasks than when 
completing easy or nonurgent tasks. 
Hypothesis 1. Within-person variability in momentary conscientiousness is contingent 
on the difficulty and urgency demands of the tasks encountered at work. Momentary 
conscientiousness will typically be higher when tasks are perceived as more 
demanding and lower when tasks are perceived as less demanding. 
Between-Person Differences in Task-Contingent Conscientiousness 
; Hypothesis 1 is a test of the main effect of task demand on conscientious behavior; it 
addresses how the typical person responds to increasing levels of task demand. However, the 
validity of a contingent approach to personality also requires that individuals differ from each 
other at least in the magnitude (if not in the direction) of their contingencies. In the absence 
of such between-person variability in task-contingent conscientiousness, the contingent effect 
could simply be the result of species-typical patterns of responding, and therefore not strictly 
within the domain of personality. Furthermore, as between-person variability in task-
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contingent conscientiousness can arise simply as a result of random variation, it is important 
to demonstrate that any observed individual differences reflect (at least partly) enduring 
qualities of the individual. That is, individuals need to show some stability in their task-
contingent conscientiousness if one is to treat the contingencies as units of personality (see 
Fleeson & Noftle, 2008).  
According to the CAPS model, the stability of task-contingent effects within a given 
person results from stabilities in the way information is processed. The model presents a 
connectionist framework in which the underlying personality system for a given person is 
represented as a set of interconnected cognitive and affective units (conceptualized broadly to 
include beliefs, expectancies, goals, emotions, self-regulatory competencies and other mental 
representations) that mediate the relationship between situations and behavioral responses 
(see Mischel, 2004). Specifically, within a given individual, situations are encoded for their 
salient features which then activate the mediating cognitive and affective units. The units 
interact dynamically and influence each other reciprocally through the network of stable 
connections, the results of which manifest as overt behavior. The organization of the 
mediating units captures the knowledge structure underlying the person’s behavior. In this 
regard, the knowledge structure comprises a set of connections that represent the sequence of 
mental steps involved in producing a given response in a given situation (Linville & Clark, 
1989). For example, an employee who has to submit a report by the end of the day may 
encode the task as being urgent, which in turn activates thoughts of failure to meet the 
deadline and its anticipated consequences, feelings of anxiety, and the goal of removing the 
anxiety by taking actions to meet the deadline. The latter avoidance goal may then trigger the 
execution of conscientious behaviors such as orderliness and effort as a way of meeting the 
deadline. Together, the set of thoughts, feelings and actions represents the person’s strategy 
for adapting to the task demand (see Cantor, 1990). 
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Situation-response contingencies develop over time through a cognitive process that 
converts relevant knowledge gained from one’s previous experiences into procedures for 
responding to situations (see Linville & Clark, 1989). Furthermore, as people have different 
neurobiological predispositions and different developmental histories they develop different 
knowledge bases for similar situations, which leads to individual differences in the encoding 
and responding to the same objective situation. In the CAPS model, these individual 
differences in information processing are represented as (i) differences in the accessibility of 
particular cognitions and affects, and (ii) differences in the structure of the interconnections 
among units. That is, people differ with respect to the ease with which specific thoughts, 
feelings, goals and other mental representations are activated, and the extent to which mental 
representations activate or deactivate other mental representations in the system. Thus, one 
individual may display a strong contingency between task demand and conscientious 
response because relevant mediating units such as thoughts of failure, feelings of anxiety, and 
failure avoidance goals are easily activated within the person, and/or because the links 
between the mediating units are strong (e.g., feelings of anxiety are strongly connected to 
avoidance goals which in turn are strongly related to conscientious responses); whereas a 
second individual may display a weak contingency because the relevant mediating units are 
less easily activated within that person or because the connections between mediating units 
are less well-developed. In this way, differences in the accessibility and organization of 
cognitive and affective units between people result in task-contingent conscientiousness 
effects that differ between people but that are stable within the person. 
Hypothesis 2. There are significant and stable differences between people in task-
contingent conscientiousness. That is, some individuals will be more likely than 
others to adjust their level of momentary conscientiousness in response to changes in 
task demands. 
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Trait Conscientiousness and Need for Cognition as Antecedents of Task-Contingent 
Conscientiousness 
Within the CAPS model, the distinctive organization of cognitive and affective units 
that produces situation-response contingency patterns develops over time as the product of 
biological and social cognitive learning factors. Individual differences in biochemical and 
genetic variables predispose individuals to different sensory, perceptual, cognitive, affective 
and behavioral potentialities that provide the capacity for adaptive behavior and that set limits 
on what can be achieved (Mischel, 1999). These biological predispositions underlie the 
cognitive processing capacity that interacts with one’s actual and observational experiences 
to influence the contingent patterns of responding that emerge over time, including the task-
contingent conscientious behaviors examined here. In the present study we examine two 
potential antecedents of task-contingent conscientiousness—trait conscientiousness and need 
for cognition—that serve as indices of the types of biological and social cognitive learning 
factors that are presumed to influence contingent patterns of responding.  
There are at least two reasons for including trait conscientiousness in our analysis. 
First, there is a conceptual basis for expecting trait conscientiousness to (inversely) influence 
task-contingent conscientiousness. Specifically, trait conscientiousness has been identified 
with a central nervous system variable that influences the ease with which behavior is elicited 
from changing environmental stimuli by influencing the minimum thresholds required for 
response facilitation (Depue, 1995). Individuals who are high on trait conscientiousness are 
thought to have higher thresholds at which changes in stimuli evoke behavioral, affective and 
cognitive responses and consequently are less reactive than individuals low on trait 
conscientiousness (e.g., Depue & Collins, 1999). This inhibitory effect of trait 
conscientiousness is reflected in the greater self-control, constraint and deliberation of the 
highly conscientious (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992), but can also manifest in terms of rigidity 
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or a lack of flexibility and expediency (e.g., Griffin & Hesketh, 2005). Conceptually, this has 
been equated with an overall constraint on the level of activation between units in a CAPS 
representation of a person (Read & Miller, 2002). In short, although highly trait conscientious 
individuals may experience higher levels of momentary conscientiousness on average, they 
are also less likely to adjust their conscientiousness downwards in response to a lowering of 
the task demands. 
Second, in order to justify incorporating task-contingent conscientiousness as a 
distinct unit of personality, it is important to demonstrate that the information provided by the 
contingencies is non-redundant when taking into account the associated trait. In this regard, 
although the CAPS model does not preclude the possibility that contingent patterns of 
responding will be influenced by the type of neurobiological variables that are presumed to 
be indexed by trait measures, a central claim of the model is that task-contingent units capture 
elements of personality that go beyond the mere effects of traits. As a social cognitive theory 
of personality, the CAPS perspective emphasises the highly cognitive nature of personality. 
People come to be who they are largely as a result of learning processes in which they 
transform their direct and observational experiences into internal models that guide their 
behaviors and that are the basis of contingent patterns of responding (Bandura, 1986). The 
relevant processes for facilitating such learning effects include cognitive processes that go 
beyond the generalized reactivity effects of trait conscientiousness. Consequently, an 
assumption deriving from the CAPS model is that stable between-person differences in trait-
contingent conscientiousness will remain after the effects of trait conscientiousness are 
controlled.  
Hypothesis 3a. There will be a negative relationship between trait conscientiousness 
and task-contingent conscientiousness. That is, individuals who score high on trait 
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conscientiousness will be less likely than low scorers to adjust their level of 
momentary conscientiousness in response to changes in task demands. 
Hypothesis 3b. There will be significant and stable differences between people in 
task-contingent conscientiousnessthat remain after controlling for trait 
conscientiousness. 
In line with our cognitive interpretation of task-contingent effects, we propose the 
individual difference variable need for cognition as a second potential antecedent of task-
contingent conscientiousness. Need for cognition describes an individual’s tendency to enjoy 
and engage in effortful cognitive activity (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). High scorers are more 
likely than low scorers to make sense of the world by employing deliberative processing 
strategies that involve actively seeking, acquiring, thinking about and evaluating social 
information (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). These individuals are intrinsically 
motivated to engage in the types of cognitive learning processes that facilitate the 
development of the knowledge structure underlying task-contingent effects. For example, 
selective attention plays a key role in contingency learning. In this regard, individuals who 
have a high need for cognition are more likely than low scorers to exclusively devote their 
attention to the object of attention (Osberg, 1987) and to selectively attend to information 
based on its quality (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Furthermore, high scorers spend more time 
elaborating on information and therefore have higher levels of information retention (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983), and this too is an important subprocess in contingency 
learning (see Bandura, 1986). 
Due to their greater information processing efforts, individuals with a high need for 
cognition are likely to develop richer knowledge structures with greater integration among 
the constructs in memory (Petty, DeMarree, Brinol, Horcajo, & Strathman, 2008). Using the 
language of the CAPS model, these individuals can be said to have mediating cognitive and 
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affective units that are more accessible (i.e., have lower thresholds of activation) and 
interconnected than the knowledge structures of low scorers (see Petty et al., 2008). 
Empirically, several sources of evidence support this assertion. For example, compared to 
low scorers, high scores have stronger links between their moods and their thoughts (e.g., 
Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993), their thoughts and their attitudes (see 
Cacioppo et al., 1996), and their attitudes and their behaviors (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez, 1986). They report less uncertainty about the nature of cause and effect 
relationships in the social world (e.g., Weary & Edwards, 1994) and possess more complex 
schemata for explaining human behavior (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & 
Reeder, 1986). They are also more prone to the effects of subtle priming cues on behavioral 
and attitudinal responses (e.g., Petty et al., 2008). 
Given the greater accessibility and interconnectivity of cognitive-affective units 
among individuals high on need for cognition, it follows that changes in situational cues are 
more likely to activate the mediating units in these individuals, and that once a construct has 
been activated it is more likely to impact other mediating units in the system, ultimately 
resulting in a behavioral response to the triggering cue. Consequently, to the extent that 
adjusting conscientious behavior to fit with the level of task demand represents an adaptive 
pattern of responding, individuals high on need for cognition should display higher levels of 
trait-contingent conscientiousness. We are not aware of any studies that have directly tested 
this hypothesized effect of need for cognition, however some supporting evidence comes 
from a study conducted by Evans, Kirby, and Fabrigar (2003). In that study, need for 
cognition was found to correlate strongly (r = .59) with a self-report measure of adaptive 
control. Indicatively, the latter scale assesses an individual’s situationally-conditional use of 
self-regulatory behaviors and contains many items that ask about the contingency of such 
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behaviors on task requirements (e.g., “I place a lot of importance on adjusting my study 
methods to meet the requirements of particular tasks”, see Cantwell & Moore, 1996). 
Hypothesis 4. Need for cognition will be positively related to task-contingent 
conscientiousness. That is, individuals who score high on need for cognition will be 
more likely than low scorers to adjust their level of momentary conscientiousness in 
response to changes in task demands. 
Performance Consequences of Task-Contingent Conscientiousness 
A final aim of the present study is to provide data in relation to the performance 
consequences of task-contingent conscientiousness.  Conceptually, task-contingent 
conscientiousness captures information about the adaptability of individuals. Individuals who 
score high on this variable are more likely than low scorers to differentiate between tasks in 
terms of their demand levels and to alter their level of momentary conscientiousness in 
response to changes in task demands. This pattern of responding aligns with the criterion 
construct of adaptive performance, which has been defined in terms of the performance that 
results when a person adjusts their behavior to fit the changing demands of the situation (see 
Stokes, 2008). Consequently, within work settings, task-contingent conscientiousness is 
likely to be of most relevance for predicting measures of adaptive performance.  
The literature on adaptive performance is diverse and includes different approaches to 
conceptualizing and operationalizing the construct. One approach defines the construct 
broadly to include various dimensions that are assessed using self-report scales, such as 
creative problem solving, interpersonal adaptability, cultural adaptability and physically-
oriented adaptability (Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000). A second perspective 
that is more closely aligned with our approach conceptualizes adaptive performance as 
performance under shifting task contexts, and operationalizes it using performance tasks that 
are administered under increasing complexity conditions (e.g., Kozlowski et al., 2001; Le 
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Pine, Colquitt, & Erez, 2000; Mumford, Baughman, Threlfall, Uhlman, & Costanza, 1993).  
Within this approach, psychological processes that boost motivation in the face of increasing 
task complexity are seen as key for performing adaptively. An increase in task complexity 
makes greater demands on the psychological resources of individuals in that they need to 
transfer their knowledge from the simpler tasks to the more complex ones (Kozlowski et al., 
2001) and to relearn how to do the task in light of the change  (Le Pine et al., 2000). 
Individuals can be said to be performing adaptively to the extent that they maintain their 
performance level following the increase in task complexity. One way in which this is 
achieved is through an increase in conscientiousness-related behaviors such as effort, 
perseverance, attentiveness, and methodicalness (Le Pine et al., 2000). Conversely, if 
individuals fail to adjust their level of effort and focus commensurate with the increase in 
task complexity then decrements in performance are likely to ensue. Given that task-
contingent conscientiousness describes the extent to which an individual’s conscientious 
behavior is responsive to changes in task demands, we expect high scorers will display higher 
levels of adaptive performance than low scorers. 
We note that the approach to adaptive performance that we adopt here is an individual 
differences one. Within this perspective, the aim is to examine the stable characteristics of 
people that distinguish between adaptive and non-adaptive individuals (see LePine et al., 
2000). For example, previous research has found that individual differences in cognitive 
ability and creativity-related traits are positive predictors of adaptive performance (Le Pine et 
al., 2000; Mumford et al., 1993). We contend that by capturing information about stable 
differences in the ways in which individuals motivationally respond to changing task 
demands, trait-contingent conscientiousness will also serve to distinguish between individuals 
who are and are not likely to perform adaptively. Specifically, we hypothesize:  
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Hypothesis 5. Task-contingent conscientiousness will positively predict adaptive 
performance. Individuals who have higher levels of task-contingent conscientiousness 
will be more likely than low scorers to maintain their performance in the face of 
increasing task complexity. 
Method 
Overview 
The present research was conducted in the context of an ongoing long term training 
and development program for midlevel managers from several large multinational 
companies. As part of the overall program, the managers attend three-day residential modules 
approximately every six months. At the modules they participate in activities such as 
listening to lectures, completing learning tasks, receiving feedback on their performance, 
giving presentations, and participating in team building exercises. In between modules the 
participants complete various field-based activities. The data for the present study was 
collected as part of the residential modules and as part of a three-week experience sampling 
field study that participants completed between modules.  
Participants 
The participants were 132 managers (76 men and 56 women) from four large 
companies. Sixty of the participants worked for an insurance company, 52 worked for an 
international airline, 13 worked for a broadcasting corporation, and 7 worked for a bank. 
Upon joining the program the average participant was 33.64 years old (SD = 6.07) and had 
4.81 (SD = 4.30) years of management experience. The majority of participants either had an 
undergraduate (n = 55) or postgraduate (n = 35) level of education, and a further 21 reported 
a high school education. Twenty-one participants either selected ‘other’ or else did not report 
their level of education. Nine participants who responded to fewer than one out every five 
experience samples were subsequently omitted to maintain data quality.  
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Procedure 
As part of their first module, participants completed trait-based measures of 
personality, including the personality scales that are included in the present study. In this 
module, they also completed a cognitive task that served as the basis of the test of Hypothesis 
5. Six months later, during their second module, participants were introduced to experience 
sampling as a methodology for capturing the dynamic aspects of personality. As part of this 
3-day module the majority of the participants completed experience sampling questionnaires 
approximately every 60 to 90 minutes that served to familiarize them with the methodology 
and that were used as pilot data for research purposes. Subsequently, in the intervening period 
between the second and third modules, participants completed the field-based experience 
sampling activity that forms the basis of data reported in the present paper.  
To implement the experience sampling activity, each manager was provided with a 
handheld computer that they carried with them over a three-week period at work. The 
managers were briefed on how to use the devices and provided with a written set of 
instructions that they could refer to. Five times each workday between the times of 9am and 
7pm the devices’ alarms would ring and a message would pop up to signal to the participants 
that it was time to complete an experience sampling questionnaire (which took approximately 
two minutes to complete). The signals occurred randomly within each two hour period (e.g., 
9am-11am, 11am-1pm, etc.) with the constraint that the signals were no less than one hour 
apart and no more than three hours apart. The participants were informed that they had a 30-
minute response window in which to respond to each signal, and that if they were unable to 
do so within this time period that they should wait for the next signal. They were also given 
details of who to contact in case their device malfunctioned or if they had any questions 
during the study period. The handheld computers were collected at the end of the three-week 
period and the managers were presented with detailed feedback reports at their next module. 
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In total, 4,931 signals were responded to, corresponding to an average of 40 responses per 
person (response rate = 53%). Sixty-nine of the responses were subsequently omitted due to 
missing data, resulting in a final total of 4,887 responses. 
Materials 
Experience sampling items. The experience sampling questionnaire consisted of four 
items that assessed the participant’s momentary conscientiousness and two items that 
assessed the perceived task demand characteristics (task difficulty and task urgency), as well 
as a series of other items that were not part of the present study. The questionnaire directed 
individuals to think of the task they were currently engaged in and to respond to each item 
with that task in mind. The momentary conscientiousness items assessed the individual’s 
level of task efficiency (“How efficiently are you working on this task”), task systematicity 
(“How systematically are you approaching this task”), task effort (“How hard are you 
working on this task”) and task focus (“How focussed are you on this task”). These items 
were chosen because they provide a relatively broad representation of the facets within the 
conscientiousness domain (given the constraint on the number of items that can feasibly be 
incorporated in an experience sampling study) and that are relevant as descriptors of how 
conscientiousness manifests in the context of work tasks. Efficient, systematic and 
hardworking are characteristic attributes of the conscientiousness dimension and have been 
included in several previous brief measures of the construct (e.g., Fleeson, 2001; Saucier, 
1994). Task focus has less often been included in measures of the dimension, however 
conceptually it taps into aspects of conscientiousness related to self-discipline, such as 
avoiding distractions and not procrastinating. The task demand characteristics assessed task 
difficulty (“How difficult is this task for you”) and task urgency (“How much time pressure 
are you experiencing while performing this task”). Each item was responded to on a seven-
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point scale from “Not at all” or “None at all” (scored as 0) to “Extremely” or “A lot” (scored 
as 6). 
To assess the dimensionality underlying the six items at the within-person level, we 
performed a P-factor analysis (see Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1998) of the within-person 
correlations among the items, using the pilot data collected in the module. The analysis 
provided support for two underlying dimensions, the first of which was defined by the four 
momentary conscientiousness items (loadings: focus = .77, efficiency = .70, effort = .58, and 
systematicity = .55), and the second of which was defined by the two task demand 
characteristics (loadings: difficulty = .86 and urgency = .54). A replication of the analysis 
using the field data yielded similar findings: One factor was defined by the items efficiency 
(.92), systematicity (.80), focus (.77) and effort (.54), and the other by the items difficulty 
(.86) and urgency (.80). These results provide support for the distinctiveness of the task 
demand and momentary conscientiousness dimensions, and suggest that a reliable index of 
each dimension can be obtained by aggregating the items that load on each factor. 
Consequently, we aggregated the two task characteristic items to obtain an aggregated 
measure of task demand (Cronbach α = .74), and combined the other four items to assess 
momentary conscientiousness (Cronbach α = .80). 
Trait conscientiousness. As part of baseline assessments, participants had completed 
Goldberg’s 50-item IPIP measure of the NEO personality inventory (see Goldberg, 1999). 
The items were responded to on a visual analog (slider) scale that was anchored by the labels 
“strongly disagree” (scored as 0) to “strongly agree” (scored as 100). The 10-items that 
constituted each scale were averaged (after reverse coding the appropriate items) to obtain 
scores for each of the five dimensions. In the present study we included participants’ scores 
on the conscientiousness scale as a measure of their level of trait conscientiousness. To obtain 
scores that were within a similar range to the experience sampling item scores, the trait scores 
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were rescaled so that the minimum and maximum possible values were 0 and 6 (M = 4.13, 
SD = 0.85, Cronbach α = .87). 
Need for cognition. Need for cognition was assessed using the 18-item short-form of 
the need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984).  The items were responded to on 
a visual analog (slider) scale that was anchored by the labels “strongly disagree” (scored as 0) 
to “strongly agree” (scored as 100). Individuals’ scores on the 18 items were averaged (after 
the appropriate reverse coding) and rescaled so that the minimum and maximum values were 
0 and 6 (M = 4.08, SD = 0.56, Cronbach α = .84). 
Adaptive task performance. The participants completed an untimed task in which they 
were presented with 25 problems that each required them to select the next two letters in a 
series of letters according to the rule that is embodied by the series. Task complexity was 
manipulated by varying the number of operations underlying sequence change for different 
problems. Specifically, the complexity of the problems increased progressively such that the 
first five problems required the identification of a single operation (e.g., sequence = B D F H 
J, operation = move two letters forward in the alphabet), the second five problems required 
the identification of two operations (e.g., sequence = B Q D P F O H, operations = move to 
letters forward on odd letters, move one letter back on even letters), the third set of five 
problems encapsulated three operations and so on. Participants received a score of 1 for each 
problem that was responded to correctly. Separate performance scores for each complexity 
level were derived by calculating the average number of correct responses out of five at that 
level. Baseline performance in our task is represented in terms of performance on the simpler 
blocks of problems and the shift in task context is represented by progression to more 
complex blocks. Performing well on the subsequent blocks requires transferring strategies for 
solving problems in the simpler contexts and adapting them to the more complex contexts. In 
line with our conceptualization of adaptive performance as the extent to which performance 
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is maintained in the face of increasing task complexity, we used to each participant’s score on 
each block to determine the change in performance as a function of changing complexity 
level for each participant (as described in the Results section), which, in turn served as the 
criterion measure of adaptive performance. 
Data Analysis 
To test our hypotheses we conducted a series of hierarchical linear modeling analyses 
using the HLM software package (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, & Congdon, 2000). We 
conducted our analyses following the hypothesis testing procedures of Raudenbush and Bryk 
(2002) and we use their notation for three-level models to present the findings. To model 
momentary conscientiousness as a latent construct, we used three-level models in which the 
momentary conscientiousness items (level 1) were clustered within occasions of 
measurement (level 2) which in turn were clustered within people (level 3). In these analyses, 
level 1 is used to model the observed variability in the momentary conscientiousness items as 
a function of a latent momentary conscientiousness score and error variance. Levels 2 and 3 
of the models are then used to estimate and account for within-person and between-person 
variability in the latent momentary conscientiousness construct. This approach allows us to 
isolate the between-item variability from that associated with latent momentary 
conscientiousness, to test the statistical significance of the within-person variability in latent 
momentary conscientiousness, and to obtain a reliability estimate for the assessment of 
momentary conscientiousness at the occasion level (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, Chapters 
8 and 11, for a more extensive treatment of the benefits and procedures for modeling latent 
constructs within a hierarchical linear modeling framework). The specific analyses that we 
performed to test each hypothesis are discussed in the results section.1 
                                                
1 As the HLM software does not accommodate four-level hierarchical linear models, we were not able to 
perform analyses in which the different organizations constituted a fourth level of analysis. However, to 
examine organization membership effects, we conducted three-level analyses in which occasions, persons, and 
organizations constituted the three levels. These analyses revealed little evidence for organization effects, and 
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Results 
Table 1 presents the results of a fully unconditional analysis in which the total 
variability in the four momentary conscientiousness items was partitioned into three 
components: (i) variability between people in latent momentary conscientiousness, (ii) 
variability within person in latent momentary conscientiousness, and (iii) error variance. 
Between-person variability was significantly different from zero (τβ = 0.29, χ2 = 1591, p < 
.01). That is, individuals differ from each other in how conscientiously they typically behave 
at work. More importantly, within-person variability was also statistically significant (τπ= 
0.75, χ2 = 16991, p < .01), accounted for the majority (72%) of the total variability in latent 
momentary conscientiousness, and could be reliably assessed (see Table 1). These findings 
are an important prerequisite for the analyses that are to come as they indicate that 
individuals display substantial variability in how conscientiously they behave from occasion 
to occasion at work, a result that replicates findings obtained with student samples (e.g., 
Fleeson, 2001; Heller, Komar, & Lee, 2007).  
Hypothesis 1: The Contingency of Momentary Conscientiousness on Task Demand 
To examine the contingency of momentary conscientiousness on task demand, we 
conducted a random coefficient regression analysis in which we entered the task demand 
variable (centered around each individual’s mean) as an independent variable at level 2. The 
results of this analysis are presented in the top panel of Table 2. Task demand was 
significantly and positively related to momentary conscientiousness (γ010 = 0.33, t = 16.82, p 
< .01) and accounted for 24% of the total variance in the latent construct. This finding 
supports Hypothesis 1: For the typical individual, momentary conscientiousness is contingent 
on task demands; momentary conscientiousness increases when tasks are perceived as more 
demanding, and decreases when tasks are perceived as less demanding. 
                                                                                                                                                  
the pattern of significant results remained essentially unchanged. Consequently, for simplicity, we do not 
present these analyses as part of our results.  
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Hypothesis 2: Between-Person Differences in Task-Contingent Conscientiousness 
In the random coefficient regression analysis reported above, the level 2 intercepts 
and slopes were allowed to vary randomly at level 3, which in turn allowed us to estimate 
between-person variability in the task-contingent conscientiousness effect. In support of 
Hypothesis 2, variability in the slopes (i.e., variability in task-contingent conscientiousness) 
was statistically significant (τβ = 0.032, χ2 = 480.27, p < .01). Consequently, individuals 
differ in how strongly they respond to changing task demands. To further clarify the nature of 
the between-person differences, we estimated the plausible range of slopes as those that fall 
within 95% of the typical slope (i.e., ± 1.96 standard deviations). The slopes range from -.02 
to .68, indicating that for the vast majority of individuals an increase in task demand is 
associated with an increase in momentary conscientiousness (i.e., for most people task-
contingent conscientiousness takes on a positive value). However, individuals do differ 
markedly in the magnitude of their within-person contingencies, in that individuals at the 
upper end of the range are highly responsive to increasing task demand, whereas those at the 
lower end are either unresponsive to an increase in task demand or else respond by (slightly) 
decreasing momentary conscientiousness.  
We estimated the stability of individual differences in task-contingent 
conscientiousness over two non-overlapping time periods. To derive the stability coefficient, 
we reconducted the random coefficient regression analysis separately for the first half and 
second half of each participant’s data and correlated the empirical bayes estimates of each 
person’s slopes across the two halves. The stability coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant (r = .52, p < .01), indicating that individuals who have higher levels of task-
contingent conscientiousness based on the first half of their responses also tend to have 
higher task-contingent conscientiousness for the second half of their responses. These results 
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provide evidence that between-person differences in task-contingent conscientiousness reflect 
characteristic ways that individuals respond to situations.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4: Trait Conscientiousness and Need for Cognition as Antecedents of Task-
Contingent Conscientiousness 
To test the effects of trait conscientiousness and need for cognition on task-contingent 
conscientiousness, we conducted intercept- and slope-as-outcome regression analyses. In our 
first analysis, we entered trait conscientiousness as a predictor of the intercepts (i.e., mean 
momentary conscientiousness) and slopes (i.e., task-contingent conscientiousness) at level 3 
(see middle panel of Table 2). Trait conscientiousness was significantly and positively related 
to mean momentary conscientiousness (γ001 = .12, t = 2.01, p < .05), indicating that 
individuals who score higher on trait conscientiousness tend to report higher typical levels of 
momentary conscientiousness. (The correlation coefficient corresponding to this relationship 
was r = .18, which indicates a relatively small effect size). Moreover, in support of 
Hypothesis 3a, we observed a negative relationship between trait conscientiousness and task-
contingent conscientiousness (γ011 = -.05, t = 2.30, p < .05). Thus, individuals who score high 
on trait conscientiousness tend to have conscientious responses that are less contingent on 
task demands. Nevertheless, the amount of variability in task-contingent conscientiousness 
remained statistically significant after controlling for trait conscientiousness (τβ = 0.030, χ2 = 
450.43, p < .01). Furthermore, the stability of these (trait conscientiousness adjusted) task-
contingent conscientiousness effects (calculated on the two halves of each participant’s data) 
remained high (r = .53, p < .01). Consequently, in support of Hypothesis 3b, there is 
statistically significant and stable variability in task-contingent conscientiousness that is not 
accounted for by trait conscientiousness. 
In a second analysis, need for cognition was entered as a level 3 predictor along with 
trait conscientiousness (see bottom panel of Table 2). In support of Hypothesis 4, it can be 
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seen that need for cognition is positively and significantly related to the task-contingent 
conscientiousness (γ012 = .11, t = 3.05, p < .01), accounting for 12% incremental variance in 
the task-contingent conscientiousness over and above what is accounted for by trait 
conscientiousness.  
Hypothesis 5: Validity of Task-Contingent Conscientiousness for Predicting Adaptive 
Performance 
Hypothesis 5 was tested in two stages. First, to obtain our criterion measure of 
adaptive performance we conducted a two-level hierarchical linear modeling analysis in 
which performance on each block of items on the adaptive performance task was regressed 
on the complexity level of the block at level 1 (i.e., the within-person effect of complexity on 
performance), and in which the complexity-performance slope was allowed to vary randomly 
at level 2. This analysis yielded estimates of the extent to which each person maintained (or 
improved) their performance as complexity increased (i.e., the randomly varying level 2 
slopes) which were then used as criterion scores in the subsequent analyses. The criterion 
scores along with the trait conscientiousness scores, need for cognition scores and the task-
contingent conscientiousness scores (that were derived as part of the random coefficients 
regression analysis used to test H2) were then used as part of a standard regression analysis to 
examine the incremental predictive validity of task-contingent conscientiousness over and 
above trait conscientiousness and need for cognition. The findings from this latter analysis 
are presented in Table 3.2 Task-contingent conscientiousness accounts for statistically 
significant variability in the criterion (β = .23, t = 2.44, p < .05, ΔR2 = 5%), holding constant 
the effects of the other two predictors. Thus, in support of Hypothesis 5, task-contingent 
                                                
2 Two of the 123 participants who had completed the experience sampling activity were not included in this 
analysis. One participant had not completed the adaptive performance task and the second represented an outlier 
with respect to the criterion measure. 
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conscientiousness predicts adaptive performance independently of trait conscientiousness and 
need for cognition. 3 
Discussion 
The present research examined the viability of incorporating task-contingent units into 
the study of personality at work, using task-contingent conscientiousness as an illustrative 
example. Our findings were generally supportive of our hypotheses. Specifically, we found 
that: (i) self-reports of momentary conscientiousness vary within individuals in accordance 
with the level of task demand that is being experienced; (ii) there are significant and stable 
differences between individuals in task contingent conscientiousness; that is, in the extent to 
which (self-reported) momentary conscientiousness is contingent on task demand; (iii) task-
contingent conscientiousness is distinct from (though related to) trait conscientiousness; (iv) 
need for cognition accounts for variance in task-contingent conscientiousness over and above 
the effects of trait conscientiousness; and, (v) task-contingent conscientiousness predicts 
adaptive performance on a cognitive task independently of the effects of trait 
conscientiousness and need for cognition. Taken together, these findings suggest that task-
contingent conscientiousness captures a meaningful aspect of personality in the workplace 
that is distinct from the associated trait. 
Theoretical Implications 
Several theoretical implications stem from the present findings. First, our results have 
bearing on research that attempts to account for behavior at work as a function of personality. 
To date the majority of studies along this line have focused on accounting for between-person 
differences in important work outcomes as a function of between-person differences in traits 
(e.g., Barrick et al., 2001). However, the large amount of within-person variability in 
momentary self-reports of conscientiousness that was observed in the present study highlights 
                                                
3 We also reconducted this analysis controlling for scores on the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) that 
had been collected as part of baseline assessments. The incremental effect of task-contingent conscientiousness 
remained significant even after the APM was entered into the analysis (β = .18, p < .05). 
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a constraint on the power of traits to account for variability in conscientious behavior. Trait 
units are constant within the person; they describe between-person differences in tendencies 
to behave in a particular way, however by themselves they do not account for variability in 
behavior within a given person (Fleeson, 2001). Similarly, situational variables that are 
constant within a person such as job autonomy (Barrick & Mount, 1993) or reward structure 
(Stewart, 1996) do not account for within-person variability in behavior.  Rather, an 
integrative approach is required that incorporates dynamic constructs such as momentary 
cognitions, emotions and behaviors and shifting situational variables into the study of 
personality at work. In this way, one can account for both the between- and within-person 
variability in behavior that occurs in organizational settings. 
Second, our findings provide support for the cognitive nature of personality. Within a 
dynamic approach to personality, task-contingent effects are interpreted in terms of the 
underlying knowledge structure that links specific task cues to specific responses (see 
Linville & Clark, 1989). However, an alternative non-cognitive interpretation for task-
contingent effects is that they represent the effects of a neurobiological variable, such as that 
identified with trait conscientiousness (Depue, 1995), that has a general effect on the 
individual’s reactivity to situations. Although trait conscientiousness was related to task-
contingent conscientiousness in the present study, we also found that stable differences 
between people in task-contingent conscientiousness remain after controlling for the trait. 
Consequently, trait conscientiousness by itself does not explain the differences in task-
contingent conscientiousness between people. Moreover, we found that a large proportion of 
the variance in task-contingent conscientiousness that is not explained by trait 
conscientiousness can be accounted for by individual differences in need for cognition. This 
finding provides support for the cognitive nature of the contingencies in that it suggests that 
the tendency to engage in effortful cognitive activity—a factor that we have argued 
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determines the richness of the underlying knowledge structure—is positively related to task-
contingent conscientiousness. 
What are the specific psychological processes that underlie between-person 
differences in task-contingent conscientiousness? Although our study did not directly address 
this issue, one possibility is that differences in the strength of the contingencies reflect 
differences in the tendency to detect changing task level. In other words, the momentary 
conscientiousness of some individuals may be less contingent on task demand than that of 
others because they fail to perceive some tasks as more demanding than others. To test this 
possibility, we computed the standard deviation of the task demand ratings for each 
individual and correlated this with the corresponding task-contingent conscientiousness 
slopes. The corresponding correlation (r = -.01) was non-significant and small in magnitude, 
suggesting that individual differences in the task-contingent effects observed in this study do 
not simply reflect differences in sensitivity to changing task level. Rather, the differences are 
more likely to reside in the specific ways in which cognitive and affective units interact 
within each person to evoke a given response for a given situational cue. In this regard, we 
note that similar task-contingent effects do not necessarily indicate similar underlying 
processes. For example, whereas one individual may display high levels of task-contingent 
conscientiousness because the task evokes thoughts of failure, feelings of anxiety and 
anxiety-avoidance goals, a second individual may show an equally high level of task-
contingent conscientiousness because the task is framed as a learning opportunity, evokes 
feelings of enthusiasm and activates a learning goal. A direction for future research will be to 
further clarify the nature of the underlying processes for different individuals and the extent 
to which they contribute to individual differences in task-contingent effects. 
The present results also provide insight into how trait conscientiousness is expressed 
at work. Previous research has established conscientiousness as the strongest Big Five 
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predictor of job performance (e.g., Barrick et al., 2001). Individuals who are high on 
conscientiousness are characterized by many attributes that are likely to be advantageous in 
work settings, such as higher self-efficacy (Lee & Klein, 2002), better goal-setting behavior 
(Barrick et al., 1993), and greater accomplishment striving (Barrick, Stewart, & Piotrowski, 
2002). In line with these previous positive findings, the present study found that individuals 
who score higher on trait conscientiousness are more likely to report engaging in work tasks 
in an efficient, effortful, systematic and focussed way (i.e., they report higher average levels 
of momentary conscientiousness). However, the magnitude of this relationship was at best 
small to moderate, which suggests that trait conscientiousness is not simply reflected as the 
average level of momentary conscientiousness. Moreover, the present results point to a 
potentially negative consequence of conscientiousness, namely, that highly trait conscientious 
individuals were less likely to adjust their reported conscientious behavior in response to 
changing task demands than their less conscientious colleagues. Several researchers have 
proposed that conscientious individuals may be more rigid and less adaptable than their less 
conscientious colleagues in work settings (see Griffin, 2003) and some supporting evidence 
comes from laboratory studies (LePine, 2003; LePine et al., 2000). The present result 
suggests the rigidity of highly conscientious individuals also manifests in their every day 
behavior at work, and therefore provides a possible explanation for why trait 
conscientiousness shows inconsistent relationships with performance in jobs that require 
adaptability (Griffin & Hesketh, 2005). 
Practical Implications 
From a practical perspective, there are at least two potential benefits of incorporating 
task-contingent units into the study of personality at work. The first relates to the predictive 
function of personality and its use for making promotion decisions. Within work settings 
personality variables are among the most frequently used psychological tests worldwide (e.g., 
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Ryan, McFarland, Baron, & Page, 1999), yet their validity for predicting work outcomes is at 
best low to moderate, both in an absolute sense (e.g., Hurtz & Donovan,2000) and relative to 
other instruments (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). In the present study we found that task-
contingent conscientiousness provided incremental validity for predicting a measure of 
adaptive performance over and above traditional trait measures. In this regard, contingent 
units may capture individual differences that are not easily assessed by traditional trait 
measures but that are relevant for predicting performance outcomes. For example, current 
personality-based measures of adaptability rely on self-report items that can be transparent 
(e.g., “Adapt easily to new situations”, 6FPG Adaptability scale, Goldberg, 1999), and that 
have been shown to be prone to problems associated with faking good in applied settings (see 
Griffin, 2003). Contingent units that are operationalized as regression slopes are presumably 
less transparent because they require an inference about the relationship between two 
variables. Therefore they may be less susceptible to faking, potentially providing a less 
distorted measure of the construct of interest. Future research is required to investigate the 
susceptibility of contingent units to faking and to evaluate their predictive validity for a 
broader range of training and job performance criteria. 
In addition to their potential predictive benefits, contingents units also lend 
themselves to applications that focus on behavioral change in organizational settings. Despite 
the widespread application of personality instruments for selection and allocation decisions, 
there is comparatively little research on how to develop those attributes that facilitate 
performance at work, or to minimize the effects of maladaptive attributes. Conceivably, this 
is because the focus of the research to date has been on personality traits—which are assumed 
to be relatively fixed once established (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1999)—rather than the within-
person processes that are the causes of an individual’s actions (Cervone, Shadel, Smith, & 
Fiori, 2006). Contingent units direct the focus of personality research to aspects of the person 
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that are more amenable to change and that have often been the focus of clinical interventions, 
such as cognitive appraisals, emotional reactions, and self-regulatory skills. Moreover, to the 
extent that the contingent effects reflect underlying knowledge structures, the same 
techniques that have been employed to develop expertise in specific domains such as chess or 
computer programming (see Eysenck & Keane, 1995) may be applied for the purposes of 
personality development. 
Limitations 
We note several limitations of the present study that may be addressed in a future 
study. First, due to restrictions on the number of items that can feasibly be included in 
experience sampling studies, our task demand and momentary conscientiousness scales 
contained a small number of items. In particular, we only assessed a subset of the behaviors 
that are encompassed within the conscientiousness domain (see Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
focusing on the responses that were most closely linked to the task facilitation properties of 
the domain. However, conscientiousness also includes behaviors that are relevant when 
interacting with others, such as reliability, punctuality and ethicality (e.g., see Costa & 
McCrae, 1992). Furthermore, other personality dimensions such as extraversion also show a 
large amount of within-person variability that is likely to be contingent on interpersonal 
encounters (e.g., Fleeson, 2001). Consequently, one aim for future research will be to 
evaluate the replicability of our findings across other situational characteristics and 
behavioral outcomes.  
Second, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the momentary conscientiousness 
items were qualified with the term “on this task” and therefore assess task-specific 
conscientiousness as opposed to being generic measures of momentary conscientiousness. On 
the one hand, this operationalization is more closely aligned with our interest in the task 
contingency of conscientiousness as it excludes expressions of momentary conscientiousness 
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that are unrelated to the task or directed at avoiding the task. On the other hand, given that the 
task demand items were also qualified with “this task", the relationship between momentary 
conscientiousness and task demand may have been somewhat inflated by the phrasing of the 
momentary conscientiousness items. An alternative approach would have been to use items 
that assess momentary conscientiousness without reference to the task that is being performed 
(e.g., “Right now I am working hard”). A future study that replicates the present research 
using a more generic measure of momentary conscientiousness will shed light on the extent 
to which a phrasing effect occurs. 
Third, our experience sampling data was collected in a field setting in which 
individuals responded to signals as part of their normal day to day work lives. Although this 
contributes to the ecological validity of the study, the correlational nature of the resulting data 
precludes conclusions about the causal nature of the relationships. Furthermore, the use of 
self-report data for assessing both the situational cues and the behavioral responses introduces 
the possibility that the contingent effects are impacted by common-method bias. 
Consequently, it is important that field-based experience sampling studies be supplemented 
with laboratory studies that facilitate the experimental manipulation of situational variables 
and observations on objective measures of behavior.   
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Table 1 
Results of the Fully Unconditional Analysis: Between- and Within-Person Variability in 
Latent Momentary Conscientiousness.  
Variance Component Variance Estimate %  Reliability 
Between-Person (τβ)    0.29** 28% 0.91 
Within-Person (τπ)    0.75** 72% 0.72 
Error (σ2) 1.17   
 
Notes.  
Level 1 model: Yijk = π0jk + eijk, where eijk ~ N (0, σ2) and Yijk is person k’s score on 
momentary conscientiousness item i on occasion j. 
Level 2 model: π0jk = β00k + r0jk, where r0jk ~ N (0, τπ) 
Level 3 model: β00k = γ000 + u00k, where u00k ~ N (0, τβ) 
% refers to the percentage of variability in the latent construct that is accounted for by 
between- versus within-person components. 
** p < .01.
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Table 2 
Results of the Random Coefficients Regression (RCR) Analysis and the Intercept- and Slope-
As-Outcome Regression (ISAOR) Analyses 
Variable Parameter Estimate SE t ΔR2 
RCR Analysis 
    Task demand (γ010) 0.33 0.02 16.81** 24% 
ISAOR Analysis 1 
Intercept-as-outcome     
    Trait conscientiousness (γ001) 0.12 0.06 2.01* 1% 
Slope-as-outcome     
    Trait conscientiousness (γ011) -0.05 0.02 -2.29* 6% 
ISAOR Analysis 2 
Intercept-as-outcome     
    Trait conscientiousness (γ001) 0.12 0.06 2.02* 1% 
    Need for cognition (γ002) -0.02 0.09 -1.71 0% 
Slope-as-outcome     
    Trait conscientiousness (γ011) -0.06 0.02 -2.93** 10% 
    Need for cognition (γ012) 0.11 0.03 3.39** 12% 
 
Notes.  
Level 1 model (for all analyses): Yijk = π0jk + eijk 
Level 2 model (for all analyses): π0jk = β00k + β01k x (Task Demand) + r0jk 
Level 3 model for RCR Analysis: β00k = γ000 + u00k and β01k = γ010 + u01k   
Level 3 model for ISAOR Analysis 1: β00k = γ000 + γ001 x (Trait Conscientiousness) + u00k and 
β01k = γ010 + γ011 x (Trait Conscientiousness) + u01k   
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Level 3 model for ISAOR Analysis 2: β00k = γ000 + γ001 x (Trait Conscientiousness) + γ002 x 
(Need For Cognition) + u00k and β01k = γ010 + γ011 x (Trait Conscientiousness) + γ012 x (Need 
For Cognition) + u01k  
For the random coefficients regression analysis and when intercepts are outcomes, ΔR2 is 
expressed as a percentage of the total variability in latent momentary conscientiousness; 
when slopes are outcomes, ΔR2 is expressed as a percentage of the total variability in the task 
demand effect. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 3 
Regression of the Adaptive Performance Criterion on Trait Conscientiousness, Need for 
Cognition, and Task-Contingent Conscientiousness. 
Variable β t ΔR2 
Trait conscientiousness .03 0.27 0% 
Need for cognition .04 0.39 0% 
Task-contingent conscientiousness .23  2.44* 5% 
 
* p < .05 
